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 In the midst of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 the European Union 
(EU) pledged itself to draw the Western Balkan region closer to the 
perspective of full integration into the EU. While the EU has firmly 
committed itself to the eventual membership of the Western Balkan 
countries it has set a unique membership condition requesting ‘full 
cooperation with the ICTY’ prior to opening accession negotiations 
with some of the countries in the region. This essay tries to unravel 
why this condition has been developed and how to explain its some-
what differentiated use. The approach taken is a theoretically in-
formed analytical discussion in the form of a qualitative case study on 
Serbia and Croatia from the point of view of the European Council. 
The empirical data presented is partly novel, partly borrowing from 
past scholarly undertakings and suggests that both rationalist and 
constructivist meta-theories can yield valid explanations on why the 
EU holds tight on its unique membership condition, but also why 
Croatia seems to be closer to EU membership than Serbia. The essay 
relies heavily and advances substantively on the two meta-theoretical 
frameworks which it embodies in the empirical data presented. 
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1. Introduction 
 In January 2007 the European Union (EU) enlarged to a union of 27 
Member States when Bulgaria and Romania joined. At the same time the EU 
has opened accession negotiations with Croatia, recognised the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as a candidate and started the negotiations 
on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA)1 with Montenegro, 
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Serbia – all of which are countries in the West-
ern Balkans region. While the EU has firmly and repeatedly reiterated its 
commitment to the eventual membership of the Western Balkans countries, 
it has set a condition of ‘full cooperation with the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)2‘ prior to commencing accession 
negotiations with some of the countries in the region. The commitment to 
upholding principles of international justice has clearly become a preroga-
tive for the EU in its policy of enlargement3 in the Western Balkans region.  
 Apart from few exceptions, such as the study by Haggard et al. (1993), a 
bulk of the existing literature on EU enlargement politics has been devoted 
to the macro-political context (Grabbe and Nicolaïdis 2001; Friis 1998a, 
1998b; Smith K. 2005, 1997; Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 2000) and a 
bulk of these have focused on the eastern enlargement. At the same time 
relatively little attention has been afforded to substantive EU enlargement 
politics – such as to explaining the development of the EU political condi-
tionality of ‘full cooperation with the ICTY’ in the Western Balkans 
enlargement process. Such a caveat in the existing literature calls for a fur-




1 The SAA is akin to Europe Agreements signed between the EU and the eastern enlarge-
ment applicants in the early 1990s (Smith K. 2005). 
2 Officially titled ‘the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991’, respectfully. The essay also refers to this condition as the ICTY condi-
tion. 
3 In this essay enlargement is not understood narrowly as mere geographic widening, but ‘a 
process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms’ 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 503). Following this viewpoint enlargement is per-
ceived as a process which (i) takes place before and after the actual accession of a country to the 
EU, (ii) expects the applicant country in question to adapt its national legislation in line with the 
rules of the ‘EU club’, and (iii) spreads the EU legislation and institutional structures beyond 
the borders of the current Member States (Id). The use of this understanding will not benefit any 
theory over another but merely allows analysing an enlargement process which is short of the 
actual membership.  
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1.1. Scope and Focus of Research 
 This essay is a theoretically informed analytical discussion aimed at ex-
plaining the development of EU membership conditions, and in particular 
the unique condition requesting full cooperation with the ICTY from a num-
ber of the Western Balkans countries.  
 Firstly, countries directly applicable include Serbia, Montenegro (since 
its independence in June 2006), Croatia and Bosnia & Herzegovina. Yet, the 
scope of the essay is limited to the decisions made in the European Council 
and temporally to the establishment of the ICTY in 1993. Territorial scope is 
limited to the Western Balkans region and more precisely to the EU candi-
date country of Croatia and to the potential candidate country of Serbia.  
 Secondly, coupling the use of two inherently dichotomous meta-theories 
together aims ultimately at discovering the conditions under which interests, 
ideas or identities matter, yet, at the same time recognising the apparent pre-
eminence of inter-state bargaining in the EU enlargement politics and, in 
particular, in the European Council meetings. Whereas constructivism is 
used on its own, the rationalist approach utilises the liberal-intergovernmen-
talist theory. Moreover, the approach taken is something akin to a problem-
oriented approach advocated by Jachtenfuchs (2005) and is combined with 
an analytical discussion in the form of a qualitative case study. It thereby 
evades putting the two theoretical ‘alternatives’ against one another and in-
stead aims to use them both in conjunction to benefit from a broader theo-
retical analysis.  
 In an attempt to structure the debate on EU enlargement politics 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002, 504-8) introduce four main dimen-
sions4 of EU enlargement politics and call for theoretically informed empiri-
cal studies on the policy dimension of the EU enlargement. The approach 
taken in this study utilises the work made by Schimmelfennig and Sedel-
meier (2005) but remains purposefully EU-centred and thereby excluding 
consideration of other possible dimensions of EU enlargement politics.  
 For scholars of International Relations, and those engaged in theorising 
the EU integration, the debate between rationalism and constructivism poses 
nothing new (Risse 2000). A serious problem arises, however, in attempting 
to match these two approaches against each other. Being short of a substan-
tial theory, neither of them can directly produce empirically testable expec-
tations about observable outcomes (Haas 1971, 26; Rosamond 2000; 
Jachtenfuchs 2005, 279). Some scholars have gone as far as suggesting that 
 
4 The four dimensions are: the enlargement politics of (1) the applicant state; (2) EU Mem-
ber States; (3) an assessment of the actual impact of enlargement on both the EU and (4) the ap-
plicant state. 
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constructivism and rationalism are becoming the defining poles of Interna-
tional Relations theory (Katzenstein et al. 1998, Pollack 2001, 236). Yet, just 
as the blind men all touched a different part of the elephant in an effort to 
find out what it looked like (Puchala 1972), so too are many of the contem-
porary theories to European integration addressing differentiated interest 
while examining the same issue. Despite this, rationalism has clearly out-
weighed constructive approaches in the amount of scholarly contributions 
and has established itself firmly as a classical integration theory (Jachten-
fuchs 2005, 280).  
 Thirdly, and finally, it is arguably the European Council Conclusions 
where one should look for the most authoritative reference of the term ‘full 
cooperation with the ICTY’ as the European Council stands at the highest 
political level of the EU (Dinan 2005, 225). With respect to Croatia and Ser-
bia, Table 1 shows the frequency of references to the ICTY condition in the 
presidency conclusions of the European Council since 1993 (the year when 
the ICTY was established). Whereas not all references to Croatia and Serbia 
have included a mentioning of either the ICTY or the full cooperation con-
dition, reference to the latter has been used more often (in absolute terms) 
with respect to Serbia (12 references) than to Croatia (8 references). Yet, 
whereas half of the references to Croatia as a country have also included a 
mentioning of the ICTY condition, the same is true in only 43 percent of the 
cases with respect to Serbia. Nevertheless, both countries show a consistent 
use of the ICTY condition since 1993, although Serbia has clearly been a 
major preoccupation of the European Council throughout the years. 
 A number of questions can be asked about the development and use of 
the ICTY condition. Among these is why the EU decided to develop such a 
condition to begin with and why the EU incorporated it as an addition to the 
general membership conditions towards some of the states of the Western 
Balkans. As Table 1 shows, further questions include why the EU has held 
so strongly to this unique condition throughout the years, yet at the same 
time maintained a slightly tougher stand on Serbia than on Croatia. Thus, are 
there empirical grounds for differentiating between Croatia and Serbia, and 
if so, can one explain these through the prevailing theoretical approaches? 
These are precisely the types of questions attempted to answer in this essay 
by means of a qualitative case study on Serbia and Croatia. The context 
within which the discussion takes place is through meta-theoretical discus-
sion. 
 The essay is organised in the following manner: (1) introduction and 
brief outlook on the past studies, (2) a general discussion of the sources and 
background of political enlargement conditionality in the context of the 
ICTY and EU enlargement politics, (3) introduction to the theories in the 
context of enlargement politics and the ICTY condition, (4) discussion of the 
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development of the ICTY condition in the context of an empirical case study 
on Serbia and Croatia, and (5) conclusion. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of Conditionality in European Council Conclusions 
Croatia Yugoslavia / Serbia 
Year Ref ICTY Condition Ref ICTY Condition 
1993 2 0 0 2 0 0 
1994 1 0 0 2 0 0 
1995 1 1 0 2 1 0 
1996 1 2 1 2 2 1 
1997 0 0 0 1 0 0 
1998 1 1 0 2 2 1 
1999 1 0 0 3 1 0 
2000 2 1 1 3 1 1 
2001 2 1 1 2 2 2 
2002 0 0 0 1 0 0 
2003 2 1 2 3 2 3 
2004 1 1 1 2 0 1 
2005 0 1 1 1 1 1 
2006 2 1 1 2 2 2 
  2007* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total    16     10 8     28    14         12 
‘Ref’ stands for the number of times the country in question was mentioned in the 
European Council Conclusions that year. ‘ICTY’ refers to the number of times the 
ICTY was mentioned that year. ‘Condition’ shows the number of times the ‘full 
cooperation with the ICTY’ condition was used that year. Note: References to the 
Western Balkans region in general have been understood to refer to both Serbia and 
Croatia, respectfully. 
* The year 2007 only includes the period until April 20th 2007. 
 
1.2. European Union Enlargement: Theories of Conditionality and Past 
Studies 
 To date, the EU’s powers of attraction have been overwhelming and as 
an organisation the perceived membership benefits are beyond doubt (Smith 
K. 2003a, 136; cf. Rosecrance 1998). To this extent the EU enlargement has 
been characterised as the most powerful foreign policy tool available for the 
EU (Smith, K. 1998; Tsoukalis 2005, 240; Zielonka 2006). This was espe-
cially so in the context of the eastern enlargement which was perceived as 
the EU’s principal means to spreading democracy and security in Eastern 
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Europe (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005, 198; Smith K. 1998, 71; Smith K. 
2004, 1-2; Smith K. 2005, 271). 
 Scholarship on International Relations has traditionally paid little atten-
tion to the prospects of foreign and security policy cooperation – such as the 
politics of EU enlargement – in Europe under the auspices of an interna-
tional institution (Keohane 1984; Oye 1986; Grieco 1988 and 1996). At the 
same time existing theories on International Relations and foreign policy 
analysis have been utilised either directly or in a modified form as the 
framework for analysis. Attempts to treating the EU as sui generis have led 
to developing new theories better suitable to understanding the processes of 
cooperation and decision-making in the European Union (e.g. Haas 1968; 
Lindberg 1963; Hoffman 1966; Moravcsik 1994). Similarly, in more con-
temporary academic literature one may find that there is a growing body of 
literature that looks at the dynamics of decision-making in the EU (Wallace, 
2005), the politics of EU enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2001; Sedelmeier 
2005b; Smith, K. 2004; Wiener and Diez 2004) as well as the exercise of 
political conditionality by the EU (Smith, K. 1997); nevertheless, the bulk of 
the existing literature has treated these subjects as separate processes and 
none has discussed the issue of the ICTY condition.  
 Despite some empirical research on particular areas of EU policy-making 
(Smith K. 1997 and 2006) there is an inadequate understanding of the deci-
sion-making process at the European level with respect to the development 
of the EU membership conditions. This inadequacy revolves around ques-
tions of the dynamics of enlargement as the EU’s most effective foreign 
policy tool, how the EU arrives at common policies on particular enlarge-
ment policies (and fails to do so on others), why the Member States agree on 
certain policies but disagree on others, and what other facts influence their 
opinions. As the present essay is theoretically informed and focused on the 
European Council at least some of these inadequacies may be attested. 
 
2. Political Conditionality and the EU Enlargement Politics 
towards the Western Balkans 
 This section looks into the sources and background of the development 
of political conditionality in general and towards the Western Balkans in 
particular as well as the role of the ICTY in this respect.  
 The political membership conditionality imposed by the EU on some of 
the Western Balkans countries has its roots in the early 1990s, yet it was not 
until the Feira European Council meeting when all the so-called Stabilisation 
and Association Process (SAP) countries’ potential candidacy was officially 
reckoned (Rodin, 2006). The EU has negotiated Trade and Cooperation 
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Agreements with the newly independent states in the Western Balkans, and 
in the new millennium it has started negotiations on SAAs as a distinctive 
policy framework directed solely on the Western Balkans countries. The 
SAP includes a number of political obligations on human rights, democracy, 
rule of law and, indeed, full cooperation with the ICTY and encapsulate the 
EU’s long-term engagement in the region and is directly linked to the pros-
pect of EU accession (see, e.g., the SAA on Croatia, 29 October 2001). Yet, 
when it comes to the Western Balkans, there is arguably much more at stake 
than mere membership conditions (Schmidt, 2007). As Vachudova (2003, 
141) argues, the EU is the single most important international actor in the 
Western Balkans region and thereby in a unique position of promoting eth-
nic reconciliation, democratisation and economic revitalisation.  
 
2.1. ICTY 
 Being established by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolution 808 in 1993 the ICTY is both temporally and territorially con-
strained. Temporally it may only deal with atrocities which occurred in the 
territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1 January 1991 (UNSC Resolution 
808) until peace was finally restored. Similarly, it is territorially limited to 
consider cases from countries located in the Western Balkans only.  
 Both the aforementioned limitations have naturally set constrains to the 
EU’s ICTY condition as well. In accordance with Article 29 of the Statute of 
the ICTY all states (which are members of the UN) are obliged to cooperate 
with the ICTY ‘in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law’. Despite 
being established by the highest possible international authority - the UNSC, 
the ICTY is heavily dependent on state cooperation for the effective func-
tioning and fulfilment of its mandate (e.g. Report of the ICTY to the UN 
General Assembly 1997, 43-5). The ICTY is not only financed by states but 
also relies on their cooperation in arresting, detaining, surrendering and 
transferring the accused individuals (Article 29 of the Statute of the ICTY).  
 In light of international law (and despite being under any obligation to do 
so) the development of the ICTY condition by the European Council has 
surely been based on an internationally valid reason. Yet, as the ICTY can 
only try individuals it is somewhat at odds with the ICTY condition which is 
aimed at sovereign countries. This is why alternative reasons for the devel-
opment of the ICTY condition are better explained through the traditional 
means of developing political EU membership conditions. 
 Respect for human rights was coupled with the ICTY for the first time in 
the Madrid European Council of 16 December 1995 which pledged to work 
‘boldly and rapidly’ to ensure respect for human rights and the work of the 
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ICTY. Yet, it was in the Florence European Council of 21 June 1996 when 
the first mentioning of the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY ap-
peared. Although separate from the EU enlargement politics, the Florence 
European Council underlined the need for all parties to fully cooperate with 
the ICTY and officially established the voluntary monitoring role of the EU 
in this respect. 
 
2.2. Sources of EU Political Enlargement Conditionality 
 Scholars have defined the EU foreign policy, and thus indirectly the 
enlargement politics as well, as ‘the capacity to make and implement poli-
cies abroad that promote the domestic values, interests and policies of the 
European Union’ (Smith, H. 2002, 8; emphasis added).5 Nevertheless, there 
is no commonly agreed list of norms and values explaining the contents of 
the political EU membership conditions. Understanding the wide array of 
values and interests shared by the EU Member States might help grasping 
the reasons for developing and imposing such conditions.  
 Membership conditions can be seen as a way to protect the EU’s cher-
ished values and interests from radical changes brought by membership ex-
pansion (Smith K. 2003a, 108). According to Hughes et al. (2004, 25) con-
ditionality is a ‘gate-keeping mechanism embodying clearly identifiable and 
generally understood norms, rules and institutional configurations that are 
applied consistently and with some continuity over time to regulate the entry 
of new members’. Articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
maintain that whilst any European state may apply to become a member of 
the EU they must also respect the principles of liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (Leben 
1999, 70).6 Hence, the sources of political membership conditions can be 
 
5 Arguably the EU Member States also share certain substantial values and interests. Schol-
ars have illustrated these values and interests through the EU’s uncontested power in trade pol-
icy (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2005, 248) and by being a strong normative power in global poli-
tics (Manners 2006, 81). 
6 Distinct from what is traditionally viewed as ‘international conditionality’ (Hughes et al. 
2004, 13-5) the EU accession criteria, as they stand today, have their basis in essentially three 
broader principles. Firstly, the principle of ‘Europeanness’, a condition found already in the 
founding treaties of the EC (namely Article 237 TEC), was for a long time the only formal crite-
rion for EU membership. This principle is today codified in Article 6 (1) of the TEU. Secondly, 
subsequent to the Copenhagen Declaration by the European Council meeting in Copenhagen in 
1993, a decision to enlarge was made together with introducing criteria for the eventual EU 
membership of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs). The third accession crite-
rion, which was defined as late as in the Helsinki European Council of 11 December 1999, is 
the requirement of good neighbourliness (Smith K. 2003a, 118; Smith K. 2003b, 161).  
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traced back along the evolution of the EU’s approach on human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the principles of liberty and democracy.  
 As argued by scholars such as Sedelmeier (2006) and Grabbe and Nico-
laïdis (2000), the EU’s role as a promoter of human rights and democracy in 
international politics was not only reflected in the process of the eastern 
enlargement but was also one of its distinct sources. Other scholars (Smith 
K. 2003a, 98-9; Alston and Weiler 1999, 10) have taken a step further on 
tracking the sources of political membership conditions. Karen Smith (2003, 
99), for example, stipulates that although the founding treaties of the EU - 
namely the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic En-
ergy Agency and the European Economic Community - did not make ex-
plicit reference to the role of the EU in protecting human rights, the assertion 
of human rights and democracy was already present in the aspirations of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain to join the EU in the 1970s. Indeed, as Menen-
déz (2004) notes, the underlying values for liberal democracy shared among 
Member States have been present as an implicit EU membership condition 
in each of the EU’s enlargement rounds. 
  
3. Theoretical Approaches to EU Enlargement Politics and 
Political Conditionality 
 This section introduces and examines two meta-theoretical approaches – 
rationalism and constructivism – to explain the development of political 
membership conditionality, and in particular the requirement for full coop-
eration with the ICTY, towards the Western Balkans countries of Croatia 
and Serbia. It advances by first laying down the main characteristics of each 
theoretical approach and thereafter by examining how they approach EU 
enlargement politics in general as well as the development of a particular 
political EU membership condition and its differentiated usage. 
 
3.1. Rationalist Ontology and Liberal Intergovernmentalist Theory 
 The roots of liberal intergovernmentalist assertions of EU integration 
emerged from the scholarship of Andrew Moravcsik (e.g. 1998) who at-
tempted to theorise European integration as a two-level game (Rosamond 
2000, 136). Relying heavily on the core assumptions of realist thinking of 
International Relations and borrowing elements from classic intergovern-
mentalism, Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism has been characterised 
as an application of rationalist institutionalism (Schimmelfennig 2004). 
 As intergovernmentalism assigns Member States an adamant role in the 
European integration process (Hoffman 1966) it is preoccupied with the 
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strategic bargaining between states in Brussels. Furthermore, whereas inter-
governmentalism relies heavily on a state’s self-perception of its relative po-
sition in the state system as a basis for national interests (Rosamond 2000, 
137), liberal intergovernmentalism applies the model of two-level game and 
thereby defines national interests as a result of domestic politics (Moravcsik 
1993).  
 
 3.1.1. Approach on EU Enlargement 
 Although liberal intergovernmentalism is traditionally perceived as a 
‘grand theory’ seeking to explain the major steps towards European integra-
tion (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaïdis 1999; Schimmelfennig 
2004), its theoretical impetus has been applied in efforts to explain EU 
enlargement (politics) as well (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005; Moravcsik 
1998, 164-220; Mattli 1999; Sedelmeier 2005a, Schimmelfennig 2001, 
Smith K. 2004).  
 In perhaps one of the earliest theoretically informed studies on specific 
substantive policy areas Haggard et al. (1993) examines the patterns of in-
terdependence and the intergovernmental bargaining between Eastern 
Europe and major western powers using inter alia realist approach. As to 
particular enlargement rounds Moravcsik and Vachudova (2005, 206) 
maintain that looking at the eastern enlargement there is ‘little reason to be-
lieve that enlargement runs counter to the interest of either existing or new 
members’ who simply act in accordance with their respective economic and 
geopolitical positions and relative bargaining power. Given the existence of 
a fundamental asymmetry of interdependence, which results in relatively 
higher benefits to the applicant countries as opposed to the EU Member 
States, and a strong dependence on the EU markets, the candidates are in a 
disadvantaged bargaining position (Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005, 201). 
The political consequences of an increasing power asymmetry between the 
candidates and the EU are evidenced by an increasing number of member-
ship conditions (Vachudova 2005) which the candidates are better off ac-
cepting than by facing a possible exclusion from the EU (Schimmelfennig 
2004). 
 The point of view of the third countries can also matter although in the 
case of Croatia and Serbia it seems to matter relatively little. The rationalist 
logic posits that the prevailing power asymmetry between the EU and the 
outsider state can be explained by the differences in gross national product 
(GDP) between the applicant countries and the EU Member States. As Table 
2 shows, the GDP of the EU Member States is substantially higher than ei-
ther Croatia’s or Serbia’s, which both account for less than 1 percent of the 
GDP of the current EU Member States. 
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Table 2: GDP and Asymmetric Interdependence 
Enlargement GDP applicant / GDP of EU members 
GDP (per capita) applicant / 
GDP (per capita) EU members
UK, IRE, DK 20% 79% 
Greece 2% 48% 
Spain, Portugal 7% 42% 
EFTA 8% 115% 
CEEC 5% 14% 
Croatia 0.3% 1.3% 
Serbia 0.2% 0.6% 
Idea and data based on Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005 (on past enlargements) and 
the International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007 (on 
Serbia and Croatia). 
 
 Similarly, GDP per capita of Croatia accounts only 1.3 percent of the EU 
average, and Serbia’s even less. Both Serbia and Croatia show strong power 
asymmetry when comparing against past EU enlargements as well. These 
findings allow postulating that the two countries have relatively little to say 
in the process of EU enlargement and in the development of the ICTY con-
dition. Nevertheless, a somewhat higher GDP of Croatia (42,456)7 in 
comparison to Serbia (31,589) can be interpreted to mean that Croatia could 
exercise greater power vis-à-vis the EU than Serbia. Naturally, these findings 
are but rudimentary means to unravel the differences in the standing of 
Croatia and Serbia in the enlargement process, but nevertheless show the 
logic behind the rationalist argumentation in explaining why countries can 
proceed differently towards EU membership. 
 For a liberal intergovernmentalist the preferences on particular EU 
enlargement policies (such as the ICTY condition discussed in this essay) re-
flect the geographical position of the Member States (Schimmelfennig 
2004). The ‘drivers’ and ‘brakemen’ of the eastern enlargement, for exam-
ple, could be largely positioned based on their geographical proximity with 
the candidates, as well as by existing cross-border trade and capital move-
ments (Moravcsik 1998, 26). Thus, for liberal intergovernmentalists the in-
ternational interdependence increases with geographical proximity, giving 
rise to (material) economic gains, but also through geopolitical considera-
tions of political influence (Schimmelfennig 2004) concerning not only eco-
nomic matters but issues of stability and security (i.e. geopolitics) as well.  
 
7 GDP (in billions US dollars) for both Croatia and Serbia is based on International Mone-
tary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2007. 
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 3.1.2. Reasons for Developing (ICTY) Conditionality 
 On a meta-theoretical level liberal intergovernmentalism assumes 
rationalism as its ontological basis and stresses (material) benefits, such as 
market access and political stability, as causes for particular EU enlargement 
policies (and enlargement in general). In the European Council meetings the 
process of bargaining for such policies is subject to side payments, manipu-
lation of incentives among EU members and shifting costs to new members 
and/or candidates.  
 Hence, the rationalist approach to the Member State’s enlargement 
preference formation can also be used in explaining the Member State’s 
preferences for particular substantial enlargement policies. The ICTY condi-
tion preferences are determined by the expected individual costs and benefits 
to individual Member States whereby maximisation of net benefits will in-
duce favourable EU enlargement policy decisions (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2002, 510). Rationalist approach expects Member States to fa-
vour both developing and holding tight to the ICTY condition when such is 
likely to improve their security environment and induce general political sta-
bility or envisage future economic benefits. Naturally, one would expect the 
states with highest geographical proximity and/or closest economic ties with 
such a country to be more inclined to disfavour the development of condi-
tions which are likely to postpone or hinder the furtherance of enlargement 
(as economic gains are higher, the deeper and faster the phase of enlarge-
ment is).  
 
 3.1.3. Conditions 
 It is possible to arrive at some core conditions to explain the likelihood 
the EU is expected to develop the ICTY condition. In this respect the strong 
emphasis on the ‘major steps’ in European integration the pre-eminence of 
European Council-based decisions and its formal decision-making rules are 
highlighted.  
 Theorising issues of enlargement politics fit naturally with liberal 
intergovernmentalism when one considers the fact that enlargement and the 
development of the ICTY condition are both primarily intergovernmental 
processes (Dinan 2005, 219).8 Given that the European Council decision-
making is predominantly based on unanimity (e.g. Dinan 2005; Hix 2005), 
the formal decision-making rules requiring accession and association treaties 
being ratified in national parliaments as well as given the prerequisite of ac-
quiring a consent from the European Parliament (although at the end stage of 
 
8 This is not to undermine the European Commission, and in particular the DG Enlarge-
ment, but these simply fall outside the scope of this essay. 
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enlargement), the outcomes of EU enlargement policy-making is more than 
a function of interstate bargaining in the European Council meetings. Firstly, 
no EU enlargement policy is expected to come about if any of the Member 
States finds it less preferable than the status quo. Yet, as this essay utilises 
the outcomes of interstate bargaining on the EU enlargement policies (in-
stead of the particularities of the underlying policy-making process), it ac-
knowledges that, in line with the rationalist reasoning, such are often lowest-
common denominator outcomes. Secondly, taking into account the relative - 
i.e. unequal - bargaining power of each Member State, the outcome of nego-
tiations in the European Council can be assumed to result in an agreement if 
the bargaining power of Member State expecting to suffer net losses is nev-
ertheless sufficient to gain compensation through side payments. Alterna-
tively, the weaker state will face the threat of being excluded (Schimmelfen-
nig and Sedelmeier 2002, 513).  
 As Schimmelfennig (2004) describes, the rationalist framework of liberal 
intergovernmentalism is an agency theory requiring explanation for actor 
preferences and collective outcomes and where actors’ actions are based on 
rational choice calculations of utility maximisation under given circum-
stances. The rationalist framework of liberal intergovernmentalism would 
thereby seek to explain the development of the ICTY condition as a collec-
tive outcome of interdependent and strategic rational state choices made in 
an intergovernmental forum of the European Council. Akin to the ‘club the-
ory’, favourable decisions to developing particular EU enlargement policies 
are likely to take place in situations where both the EU Member States and 
the applicant state incur higher benefits from enlargement than the marginal 
costs (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 512).  
 
3.2. Constructivism 
 Constructivist premises, too, can be used in explaining the development 
of the ICTY condition on Croatia and Serbia. In fact, some scholars have ar-
gued that a non-rationalistic framework might be better suited for explaining 
the EU decision-making regime in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) matters whereby norms and values may have a more signifi-
cant role than the rationalist assumptions on the impact of formal institu-
tional rules would expect (Jørgensen 1997).  
 Whereas the rationalist approach seeks to explain development of the 
ICTY condition on the basis of efficiency maximisation and optimising the 
regulatory scope of the EU policy, constructivists emphasise purposive, 
norm-guided action and pursue policies coalescing with legitimatising obli-
gations of EU identity, values and norms. As a meta-theoretical attempt to 
connect traditional International Relations theories to some sociological ex-
 
60 Mäki, J.-M., EU Enlargement Politics                                                                                                                            
planations of enlargement conditions, constructivism questions the ontologi-
cal basis of rationalist premises of individualism and materialist utility-
maximisation (Rosamond 2000, 171). Hence, the basis for constructivist ar-
gument stems from the structural environment within which decisions are 
made. Here the assumptions of path dependency have a strong role: it relies 
on the idea of established formalities and routine practices explaining the 
possibilities of the policy actors (Rosamond 2000, 174). 
 
 3.2.1. Reasons for Developing the ICTY Condition 
 Following the arguments of constructivist scholars such as Schimmelfen-
nig, Jørgensen and Sedelmeier, the development of the ICTY condition on 
Serbia and Croatia in the process of EU enlargement cannot be explained by 
individual cost-benefit utility calculations based on fixed state preferences 
and relative bargaining power (e.g. Schimmelfennig 2005b, 3). Instead, what 
is more likely a reason for such conditions having taken place is found in an 
interplay between social identities, values and norms of the key actors in the 
EU enlargement politics. Yet, the constructivists cannot, and do not, refute 
the fact that decisions on (political) conditionality are made in an intergov-
ernmental setting of the European Council. 
 Based on constructivism EU enlargement politics is generally shaped by 
ideational and cultural factors (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 513). 
In this way the causes of developing political membership conditions stem 
from the shared institutional and constitutive norms (Sedelmeier 2006). Op-
posed to rationalists, the sources of interests and identities of actors are so-
cially constructed, constant to change and endogenous to interaction based 
on material positions and relative bargaining power (Rosamond 2000, 172-3; 
Knutsen 1997, 281; Pollack 2001; Christiansen et al. 1999). 
 Yet, constructivist theories may neither explain all issue areas of EU for-
eign policy (Pollack 2001), nor even all issues relating to enlargement 
(Smith K. 2004, 181), but as a meta-theory it offers a different ontological 
approach to explaining the formation of interests and preferences among the 
actors in EU enlargement politics. As opposed to rationalist logic of 
consequentiality, constructivists apply logic of appropriateness (or arguing) 
and thereby refute the liberal intergovernmentalist depiction of the bargain-
ing in the EU’s CFSP as inherently an intergovernmental process (Christian-
sen et al. 1999; Jørgensen 1997). Constructivist approach strives for consen-
sus by convincing opponents through arguing and challenging the validity of 
their opponents’ preferences (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 515). 
Consequently, in a given situation a policy-decision should ideally be based 
on the collective identity, values and practices of the EU, as well as its for-
mal rules and norms. In this respect Member States’ preferences are not 
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fixed, as liberal intergovernmentalism would argue, but subject to alteration 
during the process of arguing.  
 Despite the formal institutional rules of the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers within which the formal decisions on developing politi-
cal membership conditions are made, constructivists would argue that ra-
tionalist interpretations fail to recognise the structural environment in which 
the decisions are debated with Member State representatives. Constructivists 
highlight the diverse function and role of the actors in this process and ac-
cept that actors’ identification with the Community values and norms may 
vary both among Member States but also among Community actors, such as 
the European Commission and the European Parliament. Moreover, adher-
ence to Community values and norms can therefore be expected to be higher 
among Community actors, rather than Member States’ governments, as the 
latter can be expected to be influenced by competing national and interna-
tional pressures and identities (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 514). 
Similarly, one may expect variance between different groups of policy-mak-
ers ‘depending on their functional and organizational positions’ (Id).  
 
 3.2.2. Approach on EU Enlargement 
 The eventual policy-making outcomes on political conditionality and EU 
enlargement at large can be expected to be in line with the Community 
norms and values in as long as there is no major disagreement among the 
policy-makers on the unitary standards of such norms or values on a given 
enlargement condition preference. Therefore, opposed to liberal intergov-
ernmentalist approach, a constructivist would expect a ‘low degree of varia-
tion among preferences and conflict among Member State actors’ 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2002, 514) due to the effects of socialisa-
tion at the systemic level of EU policy-making.  
 Following the constructivist logic on the understanding of enlargement, 
both the speed and depth of enlargement, or horizontal institutionalisation, to 
non-EU countries are directly related to the extent of shared values, norms 
and collective identity of the EU. In other words, ‘the higher the degree of 
community and the better the cultural and normative match, the faster and 
the deeper the process of horizontal institutionalization’ (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier 2002, 515). Hence, the EU institutional expansion to non-
EU countries can be described as a function of adapting to the shared norms 
and values of the EU. In addition, the underlying argument for constructivist 
approach is that the EU enlargement is ultimately a value and norm-driven 
phenomenon (Schimmelfennig 2005b, 173 and 189). 
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 Table 3 describes the constructivist approach to EU enlargement as a 
horizontal asymptote whereby the speed and depth of enlargement to a par-
ticular country can be expected to increase subject to adherence to the shared 
values, norms and collective identity of the EU Member States. The EU 
enlargement is an interactive process of the applying state on one side of the 
spectrum and the current EU Member States on the other side. For enlarge-
ment to take place both sides must satisfy that the particular membership 
conditions are met. According to Schimmelfennig (Schimmelfennig 2005b, 
173) ‘states that share the collective identity and have adopted the values and 
norms of [the EU] will also seek to become members of [it].’ The EU, in 
turn, ‘will admit those states that have adopted the community values and 
norms and are therefore regarded as legitimate members’ (Schimmelfennig 
2005b, 189). As to developing the ICTY condition towards Croatia and Ser-
bia, for constructivists it is detected through empirical evidence and ex-
plained by the adherence to the EU’s liberal norms and values and collective 
identity (Skålnes 2005, 229).  
 
 3.2.3. Conditions 
 To constructivists identities (i.e. constructions of nationhood and state-
hood) shape interests and therefore also the EU enlargement policies (Gstöhl 
2005, 39; Wendt 1994, 385). Similarly, constructivists tend to ignore those 
theories which misrepresent the role of collective identities and their impact 
on interstate relations (Wendt 1994, 391). According to Risse (2001, 201) 
national identities are context-bound and will therefore create reluctance for 
deeper or faster enlargement should the identity be threatened by the pros-
pect of enlargement. Yet, for constructivists the attitudes and interests may 
change over time when the old concepts underlying the identities change or 
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titude toward a given EU enlargement policy change, this, to constructivists, 
is a sign of prior changed national identity (Gstöhl 2005, 40).  
 
4. Empirical Evidence: Cases of Croatia and Serbia 
 The discussion in this section aims at elaborating the development and 
differentiated use of the ICTY condition through empirical evidence whilst 
analysing them through the theoretical arguments of the previous section.  
 In the midst of the Kosovo crisis in 1999 during the German EU presi-
dency, the Council of Ministers adopted a common position in Cologne 
where the EU pledged itself to draw ‘the region closer to the perspective of 
full integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of 
contractual relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each 
country, with a perspective of European Union membership on the basis of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met’ 
(European Council 1999a, Common Position, para. 72). Despite making no 
explicit reference to the ICTY condition, the necessity of fulfilling the politi-
cal membership conditions in general was implicit through the Copenhagen 
Principles. 
 In the European Council pledges and demands referring either directly to 
the ICTY condition or using the language of political conditionality have 
consistently been used since the creation of the ICTY for both Croatia and 
Serbia – as is evidenced in Table 19 – and the ICTY condition has become a 
key accession partnership priority. Moreover, while all countries in the 
Western Balkans have the prospect of becoming members of the EU – an 
objective endorsed by the Feira European Council of 19 June 2000 and later 
confirmed by the Thessaloniki European Council of 19/20 June 2003 – the 
EU has opted for an individual approach to the Western Balkan enlargement.  
 
4.1. Background on Croatia 
 Croatia applied for EU membership in February 2003 and, following the 
Commission Opinion on Croatia’s application for EU membership in April 
2004, the Brussels European Council of 17/18 June 2004 decided to give a 
go ahead for opening accession negotiations on the condition that Croatia 
will ‘maintain full cooperation with the ICTY and take all necessary steps to 
ensure that the remaining indictee [Gen. Ante Gotovina] is located and trans-
ferred to The Hague’ (European Council 2004, Presidency Conclusions, 
para. 35). Half a year later the European Council of 16/17 December 2004 
 
9 Eight times with respect to Croatia and twelve times to Serbia, as Table 1 shows. 
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decided that 17 March 2005 was to be the date of opening the negotiations 
with Croatia and reiterated the condition that General Gotovina is transferred 
to The Hague; nevertheless, as Gotovina remained at large, negotiations 
were postponed on the last minute in March 2005 (European Council 2005, 
Presidency Conclusions). 
 Finally, on 3 October 2005 Croatia’s applicant status was officially 
recognised. This took place on the same day as the ICTY Chief Prosecutor 
Carla del Ponte announced that Croatia now cooperated fully with the ICTY 
(BBC News, 4 October 2005). General Gotovina was subsequently arrested 
in Spain on 7 December 2005 and brought before the ICTY to stand trial.  
 In terms of contractual relations Croatia’s process towards EU member-
ship was launched already during the French EU Presidency in November 
2000. The presidential and legislative elections held in Croatia in early 2000 
had arguably signalled a move towards democracy as a green light was 
shown to Croatia’s EU membership aspirations. As a first step in the EU 
enlargement process the negotiation of the SAP was launched at the Zagreb 
Summit in 2000. The final declaration to the Zagreb Summit reiterated the 
demand for Croatia to respect its international obligations with regard to the 
ICTY (Final Declaration, Zagreb Summit 2000, para. 2). The SAA on Croa-
tia, which entered into force four years after its signing in February 2005 and 
which does not include any reference to the ICTY condition, establishes of-
ficial contractual relations between the EU and Croatia until the eventual ac-
cession takes place in future.  
 
4.2. Background on Serbia 
 The start of the EU enlargement towards Serbia can be traced back to the 
late 1980s and the fall of communism in Europe. Yugoslavia was included, 
inter alia, in the Council Regulation on economic aid to certain Central and 
Eastern European countries (i.e. the PHARE programme), but was subse-
quently removed at the start of the 1990s upon the outbreak of war. Until 
then Yugoslavia had arguably been the most western of the East European 
countries (Smith K. 2005, 275). Serbia’s route to the EU was closed during 
the wars fought in the Western Balkans in the 1990s.  
 An official pledge for eventual EU membership was finally made in the 
late 1990s. In 1999 a Council common position officially extended the pros-
pect of EU enlargement to Serbia once it had fulfilled the Copenhagen po-
litical membership criteria (European Council 1999a, Common Position, 
para. 7). Combined with reference to explicit criteria such a commitment by 
the EU in the midst of the Kosovo crisis was aimed at repeating what had 
been successfully applied to the CEECs (Smith K. 2005, 285), i.e. to offer a 
carrot to encourage reforms as well as ending the conflict in the Balkans. 
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 In 2000 the Zagreb Summit reiterated the promise of including Serbia to 
the SAP on an individual basis and signalled the prospect of eventually 
signing of an SAA. The European Commission was assigned the task to 
work on a feasibility study with a view to negotiating directives for an SAA 
(Final Declaration, Zagreb Summit 2000). Finally, in the Feasibility Report 
of 12 April 2005 Serbia and Montenegro was deemed sufficiently prepared 
to negotiate an SAA. 
 Looking at the current situation, the European Council of 18 June 2006 
(and reiterated again on 15 December 2006) stopped the negotiations with 
Serbia until it fully cooperates with the ICTY. The European Commission 
had suggested calling off the SAA negotiations in May 2006 (European 
Commission 2006a, Progress Report on Serbia, 5). In the European Com-
mission’s recent communication the prospect of Serbia’s eventual EU acces-
sion was tied with meeting the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY 
(European Commission 2006b, Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 
2006-2007, 14). Following the parliamentary elections held in Serbia in 
spring 2007 and the new government in place, the SAA negotiations re-
sumed again on 13 June 2007 (BBC News, 7 June 2007) – despite the fact 
that the ICTY’s main indictees, General Mladic and Dr. Karadzic still re-
mained at large. 
 
4.3. Development and Use of the ICTY Condition: Theoretical Analysis 
 As established in section 3, geographical proximity of the countries vis-
à-vis the EU can be used to define theoretical explanations for the develop-
ment of the ICTY condition. Similarly, the existence of EU liberal norms 
and values as a reflection of the EU standards on its core values and norms 
can also be used in explaining the Member State attitudes towards Croatia 
and Serbia in the question of the development and use of the ICTY condi-
tion. 
 
 4.3.1. Rationalist / Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach 
 It is useful to look into the opportunities for economic gains based on 
geographical proximity of the EU Member States vis-à-vis Croatia and Ser-
bia. Geographical proximity is what Moravcsik (1998, 26) describes as a 
‘proxy variable’, determining ultimately the national preferences due to dif-
ferentiated impact of a Member State’s geographical locations in creating 
cross-border trade and investment opportunities (Schimmelfennig 2005a, 
144).  
 Table 4 describes the opportunities for economic gains based on trade 
whereby each Member State’s share of EU trade with Croatia is compared 
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with its share of the EU economic output. Should the liberal intergovern-
mentalist prediction hold true, one would expect the countries having a dis-
proportionately high share of trade to be geographically closest to Croatia, 
and subsequently to have more favourable opinion of Croatia’s membership 
in the EU and/or favour more lenient conditions for its membership. 
 
Table 4: EU Member State Shares of Exports to Croatia in 2006 (Million 
Euro) and EU Economic Output 
Country Export share EU Output share 
Disproportionately high share of exports 
Sweden  3.6% 2.7% 
Czech Republic  1.9% 1% 
Italy  36.5% 12.9% 
Slovakia  1.2% 0.4% 
Hungary  2.6% 0.8% 
Proportional share of exports 
Denmark  0.5% 1.9% 
Greece  0.5% 2.1% 
Austria  9.6% 2.2% 
Germany  16.4% 20.2% 
France  3.2% 15.5% 
Cyprus  0.7% 0.1% 
UK 2.9% 16.5% 
Spain  1.1% 8.5% 
Finland  0.2% 1.5% 
Portugal  0.1% 1.4% 
Slovenia  13% 0.3% 
Malta  1.7% 0% 
Disproportionately low share of exports 
Luxembourg  0.1% 0.3% 
Ireland  0.4% 1.5% 
Netherlands  1.4% 4.6% 
Belgium  0.9% 2.7% 
Lithuania  0.1% 0.2% 
Latvia  0.1% 0.1% 
Estonia  0.1% 0.1% 
Poland  1.7% 2.4% 
The shares of exports have been divided into three categories. The countries with 
disproportionately high or low share of exports have 25 % difference in ‘Export 
share’ compared to that country’s share of EU output (i.e. ‘EU Output share’) calcu-
lated in percentage points. The idea is borrowed from Schimmelfennig (2001). The 
data on Croatia is based on the Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics. 
‘Output share’ is calculated from GDP per capita, current prices in 2006 per EU 
member State from the EU total output in 2006 (Eurostat data). 
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 Table 4 sheds some, although not fully straightforward, light for the 
rationalist expectations as the disproportionately high share of exports by the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary exemplifies. The three countries 
being part of the CEECs that entered the EU in 2004 have all been tradition-
ally in favour of the entry of new Member States from the Western Balkans 
as well as are all geographically closest to Croatia of the 2004 entries.  
 In addition, the disproportionately high loading on Italy is also further 
proof for rationalist expectations. Italy is directly bordering Croatia and has 
the highest share of exports (36.5%) of the countries compared. At the same 
time Table 4 shows somewhat conflicting outcomes as Austria, a country 
also bordering Croatia and whose insistence of including Croatia into the 
membership negotiations in the European Council of June 2004 (as a trade 
off to opening membership negotiations with Turkey) scores only propor-
tionally in terms of shares of exports. Same is true with Slovenia whose ex-
port share is as much as 13 percent of total export to Croatia but which nev-
ertheless scores only proportionally when compared against its EU output 
share. Similarly, Sweden as a Nordic country shows disproportionately high 
share of exports against rationalist expectations.  
 At the other extreme Table 4 posits the small and relatively distant coun-
tries (Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium) with dispropor-
tionately low share of exports. Similarly, of the 12 new CEECs that entered 
the EU in 2004, those that are geographically furthest from Croatia are also 
having a disproportionately low share of exports.  
 Yet, although the estimates in Table 4 offer modest support for rationalist 
expectations, this finding becomes somewhat blurred when conducting a 
similar study using foreign direct investment (FDI) as a measure in place of 
trade.10 Table 5 shows that when using FDI in place of trade the above find-
ings can no longer be substantiated. With respect to Croatia none of the 
countries having disproportionately high share of exports in Table 4 do so 
with respect to FDI in Table 5. Furthermore, none of the countries directly 
bordering Croatia has a disproportionately high share of FDI with Croatia. 
 Yet, in somewhat support of rationalist expectations Hungary, Italy, Slo-
venia (all being countries directly bordering Croatia) and Croatia’s close 
neighbour Austria are all toward the higher end of the proportional share of 
FDI – in addition to accounting for more than half of the total FDI to Croa-
tia. Similarly, the disproportionately low share of FDI for countries rela-
tively distant from Croatia, namely Sweden, Ireland (and Slovakia) does in-
dicate that geographical proximity may have some interpretative power. 
 
10 This is also necessary in order to produce comparable data between Croatia and Serbia as 
no data with respect to export shares on Serbia was found by the author. 
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Table 5: EU Member State Shares of Foreign Direct Investment to Croatia 
and Serbia in 2006 and EU Economic Output 
Country FDI share Croatia EU Output share 
Disproportionately high share of FDI 
Netherlands  8.8% 4.6% 
Proportional share of FDI 
Hungary  4.4% 0.8% 
Italy  15.5% 12.9% 
Austria  28.0% 2.2% 
Cyprus  1.4% 0.1% 
Slovenia  4.9% 0.3% 
Malta  0.3% 0.0% 
Luxembourg  7.4% 0.3% 
Germany  18.9% 20.2% 
Belgium  1.1% 2.7% 
Spain  0.6% 8.5% 
Denmark  0.2% 1.9% 
France  2.5% 15.5% 
Czech Republic  0.7% 1% 
UK  4% 16.5% 
Disproportionately low share of FDI 
Sweden  0.8% 2.7% 
Ireland  0.4% 1.5% 
Slovakia  0.1% 0.4% 
Others 
Latvia  - 0.1% 
Greece  - 2.1% 
 
Country FDI share Serbia EU Output share 
Disproportionately high share of FDI 
Germany  26.5% 20.2% 
Netherlands  6.3% 4.6% 
Slovakia  0.6% 0.4% 
Latvia  0.3% 0.1% 
Proportional share of FDI 
Austria  15.2% 2.2% 
Hungary  7.1% 0.8% 
Greece  27.0% 2.1% 
Slovenia  5.9% 0.3% 
Cyprus  11.3% 0.1% 
Belgium  0.2% 2.7% 
Italy  1.5% 12.9% 
UK  4.0% 16.5% 
Luxembourg  0.3% 0.3% 
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Country FDI share Serbia EU Output share 
Disproportionately low share of FDI 
France  4.7% 15.5% 
Others 
Sweden  - 2.7% 
Denmark  - 1.9% 
Ireland  - 1.5% 
Spain  - 8.5% 
Czech Republic  - 1% 
Malta  - 0.0% 
The shares of FDI have been divided into three categories. The countries with 
disproportionately high or low share of FDI have 25 % difference in ‘FDI share’ 
compared to that country’s share of EU output (i.e. ‘EU Output share’) calculated in 
percentage points. The idea is borrowed from Schimmelfennig (2001). The data on 
Croatia is based on the Republic of Croatia Central Bureau of Statistics. The FDI fi-
gures on Serbia are based on data released by the National Bank of Serbia, the De-
partment of Economic Analyses and Research. FDI for Serbia is converted into euros 
from USD based on the exchange rate on 31.12.2006 at http://www.forex.com 
(exchange rate: 0.7761). ‘Output share’ is calculated from GDP per capita, current 
prices in 2006 per EU Member State from the EU total output in 2006 (Eurostat 
data). ‘Others’ refers to cases to which not all data is available. 
 
 Table 5 also shows the EU Member State shares of FDI with Serbia and 
in doing so allows a comparison between Serbia and Croatia. Disappoint-
ingly for the rationalists, the geographical proximity fails to account as a 
palatable explanation as Hungary - the sole neighbouring country of Serbia 
in the dataset - fails to show disproportionately high share of FDI. The same 
is true when looking at countries relatively close to Serbia (namely Italy, 
Austria and Greece): despite having a combined FDI of more than 40% of 
the total FDI to Serbia, they nevertheless score only proportionally when 
compared against their respective EU output share.  
 
 4.3.2. Constructivist Approach 
 For constructivists the commitment to community norms and values is a 
necessary – as well as the only – requirement for an eventual enlargement to 
take place (Schimmelfennig 2005a, 154). Looking at the wide array of the 
EU membership conditions that apply to the Western Balkan countries the 
link to Community values and norms is evident.  
 Croatia has signed an SAA, applied for EU membership, been awarded a 
candidate status and successfully started accession negotiations with the EU. 
To constructivists all these signal Croatia’s stronger commitment to Com-
munity values and norms in comparison to Serbia. To test whether Croatia 
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can be distinguished from Serbia in terms of commitment to EU values and 
norms, Table 6 presents a compilation of empirical data from two sources, 
namely the recent Freedom House study ‘Freedom in the World 2007’ and 
‘Polity IV Country Reports’. Table 6 illustrates a so-called ‘Norms, Values 
and Identity Index’ (NVI-Index) which is a combined average of countries’ 
individual scores on Political Rights (PR), Civil Liberties (CL), Democratic 
Score (DS) and Polity and is used to indicate adherence to European values, 
norms and identity. In addition to Croatia and Serbia the countries used in 
Table 6 are all current EU Member States. 
 A number of conclusions can be drawn from Table 6. Firstly, it is evident 
that Croatia, with scores higher than Serbia on each individual variable, is 
superior to Serbia in terms of adherence to European values and norms. Sec-
ondly, as the scorings on Croatia, and even more so Serbia, in comparison to 
the current EU Member States show an evident discrepancy, this offers em-
pirical proof to the constructivist approach to enlargement where the speed 
and depth of enlargement is a function of adherence to European norms, val-
ues and identity. In addition, as the scores for Bulgaria and Romania are 
similar to Croatia and Serbia (in comparison to the EU Member States) it of-
fers further proof for the constructivist approach as these were the countries 
last to accede to the EU (in January 2007) and can thereby be expected to 
have a lower adherence to the EU norms and values.11 
 For rationalist approaches to the development of the ICTY condition the 
abovementioned findings do not play a significant role as adherence to 
Community norms and values is ‘at best a necessary condition for enlarge-
ment’ which in the absence of economic or security gains do not create a 
positive incentive for favouring enlargement by disfavouring particular 
enlargement policies (Schimmelfennig 2005a, 153).  
 Interestingly, based on the countries’ individual scores in PR and CL one 
may find that those countries which have been members of the EU prior to 
the eastern enlargement have almost consistently higher scores. Similarly, 




11 It is not the intention of constructivists to advocate that the longer a country has been a 
member of the EU the higher its adherence to European norms, values and identity (hence the 
NVI-Index). On the contrary, the variables used in Table 6 are those which are traditionally 
considered to having been in the interest of especially the Nordic and relative small Member 
States in the CFSP (Arter 2000; Laatikainen 2003). In line with this assumption Sweden, 
Finland (both Nordic Member States) and Luxembourg (one of the smallest Member States) 
have a maximum NVI-Index score (closely followed by the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and 
Ireland). 
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Table 6: Norms, Values and Identity Index 
Country PR CL DS Polity FI NVI-index 
Austria  40 58 - 10 Free 98.9 
Belgium  39 58 - 10 Free 98.1 
Bulgaria  36 51 20.5 9 Free 80.8 
Cyprus  38 57 - 10 Free 96.7 
Czech Republic  37 55 15.75 10 Free 88.0 
Denmark  40 58 - 10 Free 98.9 
Estonia  39 56 13.75 6 Free 80.7 
Finland  40 60 - 10 Free 100.0 
France  38 55 - 9 Free 92.2 
Germany  39 58 - 10 Free 98.1 
Greece  37 51 - 10 Free 92.5 
Hungary  37 56 14 10 Free 89.3 
Ireland  40 58 - 10 Free 98.9 
Italy  39 53 - 10 Free 95.3 
Latvia  36 53 14.5 8 Free 82.2 
Lithuania  36 54 15.5 10 Free 87.1 
Luxembourg  40 60 - - Free 100.0 
Malta  39 59 - - Free 97.9 
Netherlands  40 59 - 10 Free 99.4 
Poland  38 54 15 10 Free 88.6 
Portugal  40 57 - 10 Free 98.3 
Romania  30 45 23.75 9 Free 72.9 
Slovakia  37 54 13.75 9 Free 86.1 
Slovenia  38 54 12.25 10 Free 90.0 
Spain  38 57 - 10 Free 96.7 
Sweden  40 60 - 10 Free 100.0 
UK  39 57 - 10 Free 97.5 
        
Croatia  35 49 26 9 Free 76.5 
Serbia  29 47 26 6 Free 64.4 
EU Median 39 57 15.25 10 Free 96.7 
EU Mean         38.1         55.8 17.6           9.6 Free 92.8 
Political Rights (PR) is based on the total score in three sub-categories containing a 
total of 10 variables: Electoral Process (3 variables), Political Pluralism and Partici-
pation (4), and Functioning of Government (3), and is identical to the methodology 
used in the Freedom House ‘Freedom in the world 2007’ survey. Civil Liberties (CL) 
is grouped into four sub-categories containing a total of 15 variables: Freedom of 
Expression and Belief (4 variables), Associational and Organizational Rights (3), 
Rule of Law (4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Each variable in 
PR and CL is awarded points on a 0 to 4 scale where 0 is the smallest degree of PR or 
CL present. Democracy Score (DS) is an average of ratings for Electoral Process 
(EP); Civil Society (CS); Independent Media (IM); National Democratic Governance 
(NGOV); Local Democratic Governance (LGOV); Judicial Framework and Inde-
pendence (JFI); and Corruption (CO). The DS is based on the Nations in Transit 
study by the Freedom House. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 repre-
senting the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest. The 2006 ratings 
reflect the period January 1 through December 31, 2005. The Polity Index is from the 
2005 Polity IV Country Reports and ranges from 0 to 10, ten being the highest possi-
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ble score. Freedom Index (FI) is a combined measure for PR and CL and it can range 
from ‘not free’, ‘partly free’ to ‘free’. All countries tested are considered ‘free’ in the 
Freedom House data. Norms, Values and Identity Index (NVI-index) is calculated 
from each country’s score on PR, CL, DS and Polity as proportions against the re-
spective maximum score. The missing scores on DS and Polity have been disre-
garded in the calculation. The index ratings are based on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 
representing the lowest level of adherence to the EU norms, values and identity. 
Countries are presented in an alphabetical order. Apart from the NVI-Index the idea 
is based on Schimmelfennig (2005a). 
 
 Based on Figure 1, which presents the data from Table 6 in a different 
form, one may see the individual countries’ scorings on the NVI-Index. With 
the only exception of Romania (NVI-Index of 72.9), which scores slightly 
lower than Croatia (NVI-Index of 76.5), both Croatia and Serbia have a sig-
nificantly lower NVI-Index in comparison to the EU Member States. 
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 This finding is even more pronounced against the comparison to the EU 
median and mean values of the NVI-Index (see Table 6) which both are 
above 90. Surely the constructivist explanation to the development of the 
ICTY condition can be substantiated as both Croatia and Serbia are far be-
hind in terms of adherence to EU norms, values and identity and thereby in-
stigating Member States to favour a stricter set of EU membership criteria. 
 










 Differentiated application, too, can be explained by the constructivist ap-
proach and the NVI-Index. Figure 2 shows the scorings on the NVI-Index of 
groups of countries (based on an average NVI-Index score). The scores on 
EU-15 countries (the EU Member States prior to the eastern enlargement) 
are highest in comparison to either the current EU-27 Member States or the 
CEEC which entered the EU in 2004 and 2007. Croatia has a score some-
what close to the average of the CEECs whereas Serbia’s NVI-Index score is 
far below even the CEEC’s average. Constructivist approach would interpret 
this finding as further evidence in explaining why the Member States have 
sought to develop the ICTY condition towards both countries, yet why the 
European Council has taken a somewhat harsher stand on Serbia (as indi-
cated in Table 1 and through Croatia’s evidently higher standing in the 
enlargement process).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 While the number of EU Member States has risen from the six original 
founding states in 1952 to 27 countries since January 2007, so too has the 
number of conditions of becoming a member increased. The condition of 
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yet has its sources in the general framework of the EU political enlargement 
conditionality. As a part of political enlargement conditionality it has its 
roots in the framework of norms, values and interests which can today be 
found in the Copenhagen Principles as well as codified in Article 6 (1) of the 
TEU. In future, however, the ICTY condition can hardly become a general-
ised condition of EU enlargement due to its particular nature of being limited 
to the former Yugoslav countries in the context of the ICTY.  
 This essay has utilised and compared both rationalist and constructivist 
meta-theories in explaining the development of the EU political condition-
ality of full cooperation with the ICTY towards Croatia and Serbia. The 
theoretical discussion has formed the backbone of the essay and is reflected 
upon in the analysis of the empirical data. Whilst acquiring two theoretically 
informed explanations for the development and differentiated use of the 
ICTY condition, this essay has aimed at discovering a wider and more con-
clusive explanation by treating the issue at hand as a joint empirical problem 
instead of competing alternatives. 
 The rationalist and liberal intergovernmentalist predictions face signifi-
cant difficulties when testing the theory against empirical data. In analysing 
the liberal intergovernmentalist assumptions against the empirical data of 
FDI geographical proximity fails to divide the EU Member States as ex-
pected. When using trade, however, it is possible to meet the rationalist ex-
pectations on Croatia. In the light of the past studies it is in the examination 
of intergovernmental decision-making settings, such as the European Coun-
cil, where rationalist ontology and liberal intergovernmentalist theory has 
proven convenient, just as evidenced by the scholarly undertakings on the 
eastern enlargement; nevertheless, the decision to develop the ICTY condi-
tion examined in this essay cannot be adequately explained by the rationalist 
arguments as the empirical evidence does not conform to the materialist as-
sumptions of cost-benefit calculations and geographical proximity.  
 Yet, where rationalism proves convenient is in explaining the idea that 
the ICTY condition is an exercise of power politics by which the EU aims 
getting Croatia and Serbia to do what they would not otherwise do. It con-
firms that one of the underlying characteristics of EU membership condi-
tions is a presence of power asymmetry and neither Croatia nor Serbia has 
much to say in the development of the conditions for their EU membership. 
This asymmetrical interdependency is further pronounced when comparing 
Croatia and Serbia against past enlargement rounds. 
 Whereas liberal intergovernmentalism views the EU enlargement process 
as an eminently Member State led phenomenon, the constructivist approach 
has successfully challenged this assumption by looking at the entire process 
through the impact of informal rules, norms and values. The empirical evi-
dence confirms the constructivist expectations and advocates that, while 
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there has been a somewhat harsher stand on Serbia by the European Council, 
this is explainable by Serbia’s ‘distance’ from the norms, values and identity 
of the EU Member States. Similarly, the empirical findings validate the con-
structivist explanations to the development of the ICTY condition to begin 
with. Croatia is clearly more EU ‘ready’, and this shows in its faster appli-
cation process as well. 
 The constructivist approach fails to explain the EU enlargement politics 
solely on its own as material interests from time to time have shown to ex-
plain better the underlying change in attitude towards a particular enlarge-
ment policy. Yet, as there is no alternative comprehensive EU integration 
theory that would incorporate both ideational and material factors (i.e. con-
structivist and rationalist ontology), it is warranted to use both approaches 
hand in hand when examining the EU enlargement politics from a substan-
tial policy point of view.  
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